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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
 
Lawyer Lee Walker appeals his sentence after pleading 
guilty to possession of a prohibited object by an inmate, 18 
U.S.C. S 1791, and impeding a federal officer, 19 U.S.C. 
S 111. Specifically, he contends that the district court erred 
by applying U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual S 3A1.2(b) 
(1997) ("Official Victim") to impose a three-level 
enhancement to his sentence for assaulting a "corrections 
officer." We conclude that the district court used the 
appropriate guideline, but misconstrued the phrase 
"corrections officer." We will reverse and remand for further 
fact-finding as the district court deems appropriate, and for 
resentencing. 
 
I. 
 
Walker, an inmate at the United States Penitentiary at 
Lewisburg, Pennsylvania, worked on a food service detail in 
the kitchen supervised by David Wadeck. During a 
confrontation with Walker, Wadeck called Walker a"punk." 
Later, Walker attacked Wadeck from behind with a large, 
steel food service ladle or paddle. Walker was eventually 
charged with unlawful possession of a weapon by an 
inmate, 18 U.S.C. S 1791(a)(2), and resisting and impeding 
a federal officer, 18 U.S.C. S 111(a). Walker pleaded guilty 
to both charges, but filed objections to the presentence 
report. 
 
At the sentencing hearing, the district court accepted 
Walker's objections to the application of section 3A1.2(a) 
because the court found, based on evidence adduced at the 
hearing, that the attack was not motivated by Wadeck's 
status as a government employee, but rather his use of the 
term "punk." The district court, sua sponte, raised the 
possible applicability of section 3A1.2(b), which neither 
party nor the PSR had previously mentioned. After 
argument and additional testimony from Special 
Investigative Agent Aponte, the district court applied 
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subsection (b) instead of (a) to enhance Walker's sentence 
by three levels. The guideline in its entirety provides as 
follows: 
 
       "Official Victim 
 
        If -- 
 
        (a) the victim was a government officer or employee; 
       a former government officer or employee; or a member 
       of the immediate family of any of the above, and the 
       offense of conviction was motivated by such status; or 
 
        (b) during the course of the offense or immediate 
       flight therefrom, the defendant or a person for whose 
       conduct the defendant is otherwise accountable, 
       knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that a 
       person was a law enforcement or corrections officer, 
       assaulted such officer in a manner creating a 
       substantial risk of serious bodily injury, 
 
        increase by 3 levels." 
 
U.S.S.G. S 3A1.2 (emphasis added, bold in original). The 
district court then adopted the rest of the factual findings 
and guideline applications of the PSR and sentenced 
Walker to the lower end of the 77 to 96 month guideline 
range, supervised release of two to three years, a $200.00 
special assessment, and to make restitution in the amount 
of $4,769.69. Walker now appeals the imposition of the 
section 3A1.2(b) enhancement to his sentence. 
 
II. 
 
A. 
 
Walker does not dispute the facts elicited from witness 
testimony after the district court raised the possible 
applicability of section 3A1.2(b) at the sentencing hearing. 
He argues instead that the "corrections officer" in section 
3A1.2(b) does not include cook/supervisor employees such 
as Wadeck. The issue here is one of statutory construction 
and subject to plenary review. United States v. Huff, 873 
F.2d 709, 713 (3d Cir. 1989). 
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B. 
 
As an initial matter, Walker argues on appeal that section 
3A1.2(b) does not apply at all. For support, he cites an 
application note under that section, which provides in 
pertinent part: 
 
       "Subdivision (b) applies in circumstances tantamount 
       to aggravated assault against a law enforcement or 
       corrections officer, committed in the course of, or in 
       immediate flight following, another offense, such as 
       bank robbery." 
 
U.S.S.G. S 3A1.2 cmt. (n.5) (emphasis added). Based on the 
"another offense" language, Walker argues that the 
aggravated assault used as the base level offense cannot 
also be used to enhance his sentence. 
 
We need not decide that because Walker's punishable 
conduct is more than the assault underlying the 
enhancement. Walker pleaded guilty to two offenses: 
impeding a federal officer by the aggravated assault, and 
possessing a prohibited object. Hence, Walker's assault on 
Wadeck was "committed in the course of . . . another 
offense," namely, the possession of a prohibited object. We 
conclude that the enhancement provisions apply if Wadeck 
meets the definition of "corrections officer." See United 
States v. Valdez-Torres, 108 F.3d 385, 390 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
 
C. 
 
The thrust of Walker's argument, however, is that 
Wadeck was not a "corrections officer" within the meaning 
of section 3A1.2(b). "Corrections officer" is not defined in 
the commentary to this guideline, nor anywhere else in the 
Sentencing Guidelines. Moreover, it is not defined in title 18 
of the U.S. Code or in the Code of Federal Regulations. 
 
In support of the district court's implicit conclusion that 
Wadeck is a corrections officer, the governmentfirst 
highlights the special environment within a prison's walls. 
Next, it points out that "prison staff," defined as "any 
employee of the Bureau of Prisons," 28 C.F.R.S 500.1(b), 
have disciplinary authority, 28 C.F.R. S 541.10(b), and 
arrest authority, 18 U.S.C. S 3050. Nonetheless, these 
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factors are not dispositive of who is a "corrections officer" 
for purposes of this sentencing enhancement. Further, the 
government's characterization of the district court's 
conclusion that "all prison employees, who work in facilities 
and frequently interact with inmates, fall within the 
protection of Section 3A1.2(b)," is supported neither by 
citations to the record nor by legal authority. 
 
According to Walker, there must be a distinction between 
an officer and an employee under the guidelines because 
section 3A1.2(a) refers to federal officers and employees, 
while subsection (b)'s coverage is limited to law enforcement 
and corrections officers. Walker submits that Wadeck was 
merely "a cook/supervisor employee . . . not a corrections 
officer." Walker notes that when section 3A1.2(a) was 
amended in 1992 to its present form, subsection (b) was 
not correspondingly amended, thus evincing an implied 
intent by the Sentencing Commission to exclude the 
additional types of officers and employees covered by 
subsection (a). 
 
Walker's position finds some support in a general rule of 
statutory construction: one part of a statute will not be 
interpreted in such a way as to make another part 
meaningless or superfluous. See United States v. Powell, 6 
F.3d 611, 614 (9th Cir. 1993); cf. United States v. Wong, 3 
F.3d 667, 670 (3d Cir. 1993) (applying doctrine of 
"expressio unius est exclusio alterius"). Here, "government 
officer[s]" in section 3A1.2(a) must be a group distinct from 
"government . . . employee[s]," otherwise "government 
officer" would be superfluous. Similarly, a natural reading 
of the entire section indicates to us that "law enforcement 
or corrections officer[s]" is a subset of "government 
officer[s]." It follows then that corrections officers should 
also be considered a group distinct from other government 
employees. 
 
This distinction between officers and employees is 
supported by other statutory and regulatory provisions. For 
example, the officer/employee distinction appears by 
reference in the criminal statute defining the offense to 
which Walker pleaded guilty, 18 U.S.C. S 111. That statute 
protects "any person designated in section 1114 of this title 
while engaged in or on account of the performance of 
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official duties . . . ." 18 U.S.C. S 111(a)(1). At the time of the 
assault, July 30, 1996, section 1114 included: 
 
       "any officer or employee of the United States or of any 
       agency in any branch of the United States Government 
       (including any member of the uniformed services) . .. 
       or any person assisting such an officer or employee in 
       the performance of such [official] duties . . . ." 
 
18 U.S.C. S 1114 (emphasis added). 
 
The officer/employee distinction is also apparent in 
statutes pertaining to the Bureau of Prisons. The Attorney 
General has the authority to appoint a director of the 
Bureau of Prisons and "may appoint such additional 
officers and employees as he deems necessary." 18 U.S.C. 
S 4041 (emphasis added). Under another statute, "[t]he 
control and management of Federal penal and correctional 
institutions, except military or naval institutions, shall be 
vested in the Attorney General, who shall promulgate rules 
for the government thereof, and appoint all necessary 
officers and employees in accordance with the civil-service 
laws, the Classification Act, as amended and the applicable 
regulations." 18 U.S.C. S 4001(b) (emphasis added). 
 
Walker's argument that the term "corrections officer" 
does not encompass employees such as Wadeck finds 
further support in the Office of Management and Budget's 
Proposed 1997 Standard Occupational Classification 
Manual. There, Correctional Officers and Jailers perform the 
following functions: 
 
       "Guard inmates in penal or rehabilitative institution in 
       accordance with established regulations and 
       procedures. May guard prisoners in transit between 
       jail, courtroom, prison, or other point. Include deputy 
       sheriffs and police who spend the majority of their time 
       guarding prisoners in correctional institutions." 
 
(visited July 1, 1998) http://stats.bls.gov/soc/soc_5360.htm>. 
Also, the Department of Labor describes a "correction 
officer" as one who: 
 
       "[g]uards inmates in penal institution in accordance 
       with established policies, regulations, and procedures: 
       Observes conduct and behavior of inmates to prevent 
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       disturbances and escapes. Inspects locks, window 
       bars, grills, doors, and gates for tampering. Searches 
       inmates and cells for contraband articles. Guards and 
       directs inmates during work assignments. Patrols 
       assigned areas for evidence of forbidden activities, 
       infraction of rules, and unsatisfactory attitude or 
       adjustment of prisoners. Reports observations to 
       superior. Employs weapons or force to maintain 
       discipline and order among prisoners, if necessary. 
       May escort inmates to and from visiting room, medical 
       office, and religious services. May guard entrance of jail 
       to screen visitors. May prepare written report 
       concerning incidences of inmate disturbances or 
       injuries. May be designated according to institution as 
       Correction Officer, City Or County Jail; Correction 
       Officer, Penitentiary; Correction Officer, Reformatory. 
       May guard prisoners in transit between jail, courtroom, 
       prison, or other point, traveling by automobile or 
       public transportation and be designated Guard, 
       Deputy." 
 
1 U.S. Dep't of Labor, Dictionary of Occupational Titles 268 
(4th ed. rev. 1991) (parenthetical notations omitted). We are 
convinced that a "corrections officer," as referenced in 
section 3A1.2(b), is a person distinct from other prison 
employees. 
 
Finally, our jurisprudence counsels us to apply the 
commonly used definition of words not defined in the 
Sentencing Guidelines. See United States v. Brannan, 74 
F.3d 448, 453 (3d Cir. 1996). Applying the procedure 
utilized in Brannan, we find "correction" defined as "the 
treatment and rehabilitation of offenders through a 
program involving penal custody, parole, and probation." 
Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 293 (1988). 
"Officer" is defined as "one charged with police duties" and 
"one who holds an office of trust, authority, or command," 
id. at 820, while "employee" is defined as "one employed by 
another usu[ally] for wages or salary and in a position 
below the executive level," id. at 408. 
 
Based upon the above, we hold that for purposes of 
applying section 3A1.2(b), a "corrections officer" is any 
person so titled, any person, however titled, who spends 
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significant time guarding prisoners within a jail or 
correctional institution or in transit to or from or within a 
jail or correctional institution, and all other persons 
assaulted while actually engaged in guarding prisoners. The 
Presentence Investigation Report identifies Wadeck as a 
cook/supervisor who was the immediate supervisor of 
inmate employees in the prison kitchen. (PSR P4, at 5.) 
Later references in the PSR report characterize Wadeck 
both as a corrections officer, (PSR P11, at 5; PSR Add. at 
19), and as an employee, (PSR P22, at 7). At the sentencing 
hearing, the government referred to Wadeck as a 
government employee before the district court raised this 
issue. However, at one point during his testimony, Walker 
characterized Wadeck as "a cop." 
 
Special Investigative Agent Nelson Aponte testified that 
all Bureau of Prisons employees, including chaplains, 
psychologists, and cooks like Wadeck, receive the same 
correctional training, and that when an incident occurs, 
"You respond as a corrections officer first, and then your 
specialty, whether it be psychology, food service, chaplain. 
When the call for assistance is sounded, you respond as a 
correctional officer to the situation." On cross examination, 
Aponte testified that some employees are titled as 
correctional officers and some are not. 
 
None of this, however, is very helpful in defining 
Wadeck's status for Sentencing Guideline purposes. If 
Wadeck's title is "corrections officer," if he spends 
significant time guarding prisoners, or if he was, at the time 
of the assault, actually engaged in guarding prisoners, then 
he is entitled to the extra protection afforded an official 
victim, and Walker is subject to the enhancement 
provisions designed to do just that. If "corrections officer" is 
to have meaning apart from "government employee," and we 
conclude that it must, then Wadeck is not a corrections 
officer according to this record. First, there is no evidence 
that Wadeck held the title of Corrections Officer. Second, 
nothing in the record indicates that Wadeck spent a 
significant amount of time guarding inmates or that he was 
actually doing so at the time of the assault. Finally, the 
PSR contains internal conflicts as to Wadeck's status; thus, 
without more, the district court and the government err by 
relying on the factual findings therein. 
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III. 
 
In sum, we hold that the district court used the 
appropriate guideline. Nonetheless, we will reverse and 
remand for resentencing because the district court used an 
incorrect definition of "corrections officer." On remand, if 
the government believes it has evidence sufficient to qualify 
Wadeck as a corrections officer, the district court may 
decide to conduct further fact-finding and, applying our 
definition of corrections officer, see if Walker is subject to 
the section 3A1.2(b) "Official Victim" enhancement. See 
United States v. Dickler, 64 F.3d 818, 832 (3d Cir. 1995) 
(district courts are in the best position to determine the 
fairness of further fact finding at resentencing). Otherwise, 
it must resentence Walker without it. 
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